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WHAT  SHOULD  THE  BOARD  OF  MANAGEMENT  OF  A  PENSION  FUND 
CONSIDER  WHEN  DEALING  WITH  DEATH  CLAIMS  INVOLVING  SURVIVING 
COHABITANTS? 
MO Mhango
* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
In  an  article  published  in  2008,  it  was  argued  that  the  two-pronged  factual 
dependency test for surviving cohabitants, which was formulated in 1998 and has 
since  then  been  applied  by  the  Pension  Funds  Adjudicator  (hereafter  the 
Adjudicator),  should  be  welcomed  because  it  advances  the  legislative  intent  as 
reflected in Section 37C read with the definition of a "dependant" in the Pension 
Funds Act.
1  The inquiry under this test  is, firstly, whether the parties  (that is the 
deceased  member  and  surviving  cohabit ant)  lived  in  a  relationship  of  mutual 
dependence;  and  secondly,  whether  the  parties  ran  a  shared   and  common 
household.  According to the Adjudicator, the first prong of the test is qualified by the 
requirement  that  mutual  dependency  must  involve,  amongst  other  things,  an 
emotional and intimate or sexual bond.  In the same article, it was demonstrated that 
following the Constitutional Court decision in Volks v Robinson
2 a grey area, arising 
from the conflicting interpretations of the factual dependency test as applied by the 
Adjudicator, had emerged and the article called on the then Adjudicator Mamodupi 
Mohlala  to  clarify  the  uncertainties  created  in  the  law  by  earlier  conflicting 
interpretations of the Act.  Since then, the issue of whether a cohabitant qualifies as 
a factual dependant was determined by the Adjudicator in Hlathi v University of Fort 
Hare Retirement Fund.
3  In this case, the Adjudicator ruled that a cohabitant qualifies 
as a factual dependant  as long as it can be established he /she and the deceased 
pension member were in a permanent relationship of mutual dependency  or inter-
dependency, and that they shared a common household.  
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2   Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) – hereafter Volks. 
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In  this  note,  it  is  argued  that  Hlathi  should  be  welcomed  by  the  pension  funds 
industry because it clarifies the uncertain legal position that emerged in the wake of 
the judgment in Volks.  Briefly, prior to Volks and according to the decision of the 
former Adjudicator John Murphy in Van der Merwe v Southern Life Association
4, the 
board of management of a pension fund (hereafter the Board) has the discretion to 
accord to same-sex couples and cohabitants the same rights as are accorded to 
heterosexual  married  couples.
5  This  view  differed  from  that  of  the  subsequent 
Adjudicator Vuyani Ngalwana, who, following the decision in  Volks, decided in Van 
der  Merwe  v  Central  Retirement  Annuity  Fund
6  that  a  person  who  could  have 
married a deceased pension member but chose not to, should not be granted the 
rights of a spouse of the deceased member.
7 In light of these conflicting  decisions, 
pension funds were uncertain on the manner in which to dispose of death claims by 
surviving cohabitants.  This uncertainty was clarified in Hlathi by reverting to the pre-
Van  der  Merwe  legal  position.    In  other  words,  the  current  legal  position  is  in 
accordance with the position first articulated by Murphy in Southern Life Association 
in 1998. 
 
This note also comments on the requirements in and implications of Hlathi for the 
pension  funds  industry  and  pension  beneficiaries,  and  criticises  the  Adjudicator's 
determination as failing to expressly incorporate the emotional and intimate or sexual 
bond requirement in the new factual dependency test.  It is argued that while Hlathi 
appears to have reverted to the legal position that prevailed prior to Van der Merwe, 
the  new  test  does  not  expressly  incorporate  the  relevant  requirement  that  a 
relationship of mutual dependence involve an emotional and intimate or sexual bond.  
As a result, the note is critical of this omission because it creates a potentially new 
uncertainty  in  the  law,  and  calls  on  the  current  Adjudicator  to  clarify  this  matter.  
While  the  facts  of  the  case  may  not  have  created  the  necessity  to  expressly 
incorporate the latter requirement, this note submits that what the Adjudicator ought 
to  have  done  is  to  expressly  incorporate  or  reject  the  emotional  and  intimate  or 
sexual bond requirement as it did with the dominant-servient test. 
                                                 
4   Van der Merwe v Southern Life Association 2000 3 BPLR 321 (PFA) – hereafter Southern Life 
Association. 
5   See Martin v Beka Provident Fund 2000 2 BPLR 196 (PFA) 213 (hereafter Martin); Southern Life 
Association 330. 
6   2005 5 BPLR 463 (PFA) – hereafter Van der Merwe. 
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2  A brief overview of the purpose of Section 37C 
 
Section 37C was enacted and inserted into the Act in 1976.  This section regulates 
the payment of any benefit payable upon the death of a pension fund member, and 
places a duty on the Board to distribute the death benefit.  The term "pension fund" 
is defined in Section 1 of the Act to mean a "pension fund organisation".  The term 
"pension fund organisation" is in turn defined as: 
 
any association of persons established with the object of providing annuities 
or lump sum payments for members or former members of such association 
upon  their  reaching  retirement  dates,  or  for  the  dependants  of  such 
members or former members upon the death of such members or former 
members.
8 
 
In addition, the language of Section 37C(1)
9 of the Act provides that: 
 
regardless of the provisions of any other law, including the common law and 
notwithstanding the rules of a registered fund, any benefit payable upon the 
death of a pension member   must be dealt with in terms of the scheme 
outlined in the Act.
10  
 
Section 37C therefore overrides the freedom of testation in relation to the benefits 
payable by  a pension fund in the event of death of a pension  fund member, and 
gives the discretionary powers to distribute such benefits to the Board.
11 The guiding 
                                                 
8   Chap 1 Pension Funds Act. 
9   Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in the rules of a registered 
fund, any benefit (other than a benefit payable as a pension to the spouse or child of the 
member in terms of the rules of a registered fund, which must be dealt with in terms of such 
rules) payable by such a fund upon the death of a member, shall, subject to a pledge in 
accordance with section 19 (5) (b) (i) and subject to the provisions of sections 37A (3) and 
37D, not form part of the assets in the estate of such a member … 
10  Marx and Hanekom Manual 176.  See Sithole v ICS Provident Fund 2000 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) – 
hereafter Sithole – in which the Adjudicator set aside the Board's decision because the Board 
relied on customary law instead of S 37C to distribute the benefits, and ruled that S 37C 
specifically takes precedence over any law, which includes customary law.  See also Jacobs v 
Central Retirement Annuity Fund 2001 1 BPLR 1488 (PFA), which held that the fact that the 
second respondent lodged a claim against the estate in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act 27 of 1990 has no bearing on the payment of death benefits arising out of the rules 
of a pension fund.  This payment is exclusively regulated by S 37C, regardless of any other law 
or rules of a fund.  See also Matene v Noordberg Group Life-Assurance Scheme 2001 2 BPLR 
1604 (PFA) and Kaplan v and Another NNO v Professional and Executive Retirement Fund and 
Others 2001 10 BPLR 2541 (W). 
. 
11  See Wood-Bodley 2007 SALJ 687 for a  discussion  on the freedom of testation under  South 
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principle is that such assets do not form part of the deceased's estate, nor do the 
provisions  of  the  intestate  succession  legislation  apply,  but  are  required  to  be 
distributed in accordance with the statutory scheme, which gives preference to need 
and dependency above the pension fund member's choice.
12 Effectively, in terms of 
Section 37C, the needs of dependants override decisions on  the manner in which a 
member's pension savings should be distributed.  
 
The policy underlying this social security measure is to ensure that the monies in 
respect of which the state allows major tax concessions should, in theory, be applied 
towards the benefit of the deceased member's surviving spouse, children and other 
dependants, thereby reducing the state's liability and promoting social protection.
13  
Therefore, the primary purpose of this section is to prevent dependants of pension 
fund members from being left without financial support, and  to this end it gives the 
Board the power to implement this social security measure and minimise obligations 
of the  state to support surviving dependants.
14  Commenting  on  the  purpose  of 
Section  37C,  Hussain  J  of  the  South  Gauteng  High  Court  (formerly  the 
Johannesburg  High  Court)  in  Mashazi  v  African  Products  Retirement  Benefit 
Provident Fund
15 explained that:  
 
Section 37 of the Act was intended to serve a social function.  It was enacted 
to protect dependency, even over the clear wishes of the deceased.  The 
section specifically restricts freedom of testation in order that no dependants 
are left without support.  [It] specifically excludes the benefits from the assets 
in the estate of a member, [and] enjoins the trustees of the pension fund to 
exercise an equitable discretion, taking into account a number of factors. 
 
To achieve this purpose, the legislature embraced a broad definition of "dependant" 
in the Act.  This definition reads as follows: 
 
dependant, in relation to a member, means– 
                                                 
12   Dobie  v  National  Technikon  Retirement  Pension  Fund  1999  9  BPLR  29  (PFA);  Mthiyane  v 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd 2001 7 BPLR 2230 (PFA). 
13   Mashazi; Van de Berg v Durban Pension Fund 2003 3 BPLR 4518 (PFA); Musgrave v Unisa 
Retirement Fund 2000 4 BPLR 415 (PFA) – hereafter Musgrave.  See Marx and Hanekom (n 10) 
177. 
14   Musgrave.  For a discussion of the purpose and rationale of S 37C, see also, e.g.  Manamela 
2005 SA Merc LJ 278–279. 
15  2002 8 BPLR 3703 (W) 3705–3706 (hereafter Mashazi). MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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(a)  a  person  in  respect  of  whom  the  member  is  legally  liable  for 
maintenance; 
(b)  a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for 
maintenance, if such person– 
(i)  was,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Board,  upon  the  death  of  the 
member in fact dependent on the member for maintenance; 
(ii)  is the spouse of the member; 
(iii)  is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an 
adopted child and an illegitimate child; 
(c)  a  person  in  respect  of  whom  the member would  have  become 
legally liable for maintenance, had the member not died …
16  
 
What  should  be  clear  from  the  above  definition  is  that  the  Act  creates  three 
categories of dependants.  The first is a legal dependant under subsection (a).  The 
second is a factual dependant under subsection (b).  The third is a future dependant 
under subsection (c).  While the legislature's worthy intentions in enacting Section 
37C,  read  with  the  definition  of  "dependant",  are  admirable,  the  Adjudicator  has 
critically observed that Section 37C: 
 
is a hazardous, technical minefield potentially extremely prejudicial to both 
those who are expected to apply it and to those intended to benefit from its 
provisions.  It creates anomalies and uncertainties rendering it most difficult 
to apply.  There can be no doubt about its noble and worthy policy intentions.  
The problem lies in the execution and the resultant legitimate anxiety felt by 
those who may fall victim to a claim of maladministration in trying to make 
sense  of  it.    Any  successful  claim  for  maladministration  will  be  borne 
ultimately by the other members, the participating employer, or perhaps even 
the members of the board of management.  One admirable aspect of the 
section is its worthy intention to protect dependants who do not reside in the 
same vicinity as the deceased member.  One thinks here naturally of migrant 
labourers working in the urban areas with dependants in remote rural areas.  
By imposing a duty on the board to trace dependants the section advances 
such  persons  interests.    However,  there  is  legitimate  concern  about  the 
practical difficulties of tracing such dependants.  One solution may be for the 
section to identify more precisely the steps required to be taken, including an 
appropriate form of publication, and then allowing for a final distribution to 
known  dependants  and  nominees  at  the  expiry  of  a  reasonable  period 
culminating in indemnification of the board against further claims.  Further 
discussion and consideration is obviously required.
 17 
 
The difficulties brought about by Section 37C arise out of the three duties this section 
imposes on the Board.  The first of these duties is to identify the dependants of a 
                                                 
16   Chap 1 Pension Funds Act, as amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act 11 of 2007. 
17   Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund 1999 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) 41F–J. MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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member.    The  second  duty  is  to  effect  an  equitable  distribution  of  the  benefits 
amongst  the  beneficiaries,  and  the  third  is  to  determine  an  appropriate  mode  of 
payment.  In the discussion that follows, this note will focus on the first duty imposed 
on the Board, which is to identify potential dependants.
18 
 
3  Factual background 
 
In Hlathi, the complainant was the mother of the deceased, and the executrix of the 
deceased  member's  estate.    The  deceased  was  a  member  of  the  Fort  Hare 
Retirement Fund (hereafter the Fund) until he passed away on 27 March 2002.
19 At 
the time of his death ,  he was cohabiting with the third respondent ,  Ms Hanise.  
Following  his  death,  a  benefit  of  R400 ,000.00  (before  tax  deduction s)  became 
available for distribution to his beneficiaries .  The Board of the Fund identified the 
complainant and Ms Hanise as the deceased 's dependants.   The  Board  –  after 
conducting an investigation pursuant to Section 37C – resolved to allocate thirty-
three per cent of the benefit to the complainant and sixty-six per cent to Ms Hanise.
20 
The complainant lodged a complaint objecting to th is proposed  distribution.   She 
alleged  that  Ms  Hanise   was  not  the  deceased's  dependant  because  she  was 
employed  in  a  high-paying  job,  and  that  she  (the  complainant)  was  the  sole 
beneficiary, as the deceased was unmarried and did not have any children.
21 As a 
result,  the  complainant  lodged a complaint with the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator (OPFA) and sought to set aside the  Board's distribution and replace it 
with an order allocating one hundred per cent of the benefits in her favour.
22 
 
In response, the  Board stated that it  had conducted an investigation following the 
death of the deceased, which r evealed that the deceased had  two dependants.
23 
According to the Board, these dependants were Ms Hanise and the complainant.  In 
addition,  the  Board's  investigation  revealed  that  Ms  Hanise  was  living  with  the 
                                                 
18   Ramanyelo v Mine Workers Provident Fund 2005 1 BPLR  67 (PFA)  – hereafter Ramanyelo; 
Malatjie v Idwala Provident Fund 2005 1 BPLR 45 (PFA) – hereafter Malatjie.  See Marx and 
Hanekom (n 10) 175. 
19   Hlathi Para 2. 
20  Hlathi Para 4. 
21   Hlathi Para 5. 
22   Hlathi Para 6. 
23   Hlathi Para 7. MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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deceased as husband and wife, and had produced proof of shared expenses, which 
demonstrated that she was financially dependent on the deceased.
24 The Board's 
investigation also revealed that in  arriving at  its decision to distribute the death 
benefits, it took into account the fact that the complainant , as the executrix of the 
deceased  estate,  had  access  to  an  amount  of  R 327,850.18  from  a  group  life 
assurance policy and another accidental death benefit policy that was paid into the 
estate.
25 
 
Ms Hanise, who was joined as a party to the complaint in terms of Section 30G(d) of 
the Act, filed a response to the complaint.
26 In her response, she explained that she 
had had a formal relationship with the deceased that lasted for a period of seventeen 
years, and that they lived together as husband and wife for a per iod of nine years 
until his death, and furnished proof that indicated that the deceased regarded her as 
his lifelong partner (namely by giving her signing powers on his bank account).
27 Ms 
Hanise stated that they had a mutually supportive, loving and happy  relationship.  
She  provided  detailed  proof  of  shared  expenses ,  including  a  50%  contribution 
towards  bond  repayments,  household  insurance,  motor  vehicle  insurance  and 
maintenance costs, telephone costs, family holidays ,  and general entertainment 
costs.
28 Furthermore, she contributed financially towards the deceased 's tuition and 
maintenance whilst he was studying in Cape Town because she was his only source 
of financial support at the time.  Ms Hanise stated that they had plans to be married 
at the end of 2002 when the deceased completed his studies .  She explained that 
her financial position had changed since the death of the deceased.
29  
 
4  Rationale and decision 
 
According  to  the  Adjudicator,  the  main  issue  for  determination  was  whether  the 
death  benefit  was  properly  and  lawfully  allocated  to  Ms  Hanise  by  the  Board,  in 
consequence of a rational decision.  In resolving this issue, the Adjudicator correctly 
observed that the payment of death benefits is regulated by Section 37C read with 
                                                 
24   Hlathi Para 8–9. 
25   Hlathi Para 10. 
26   Hlathi Para 12. 
27   Hlathi Para 13. 
28   Hlathi Para 13. 
29   Hlathi Para 14. MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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the definition of "dependant" in Section 1 of the Act, and that when dealing with 
these  matters,  the  Board  has  to  fulfil  three  responsibilities.    Firstly,  it  has  to 
determine  the  dependants  of  the  deceased;  secondly,  it  has  to  decide  on  an 
equitable distribution of the available benefits; and thirdly, it has to decide on the 
most appropriate mode of payment.
30 
 
In  this  matter,  the  Adjudicator  noted  that  the  Board,  in  relation  to  its  first 
responsibility, identified two dependants, namely the complainant and Ms Hanise.
31 
In relation to the complainant, the Adjudicator further observed that a dependant in 
terms of Section 1 of the Act is defined to include, amongst other things, persons in 
respect of whom the member (in this case the deceased) would have become legally 
liable to maintain, had the member not died.
32 Accordingly, the Adjudicator ruled that 
the  complainant fell  within  this category of dependants ,  presumably because the 
deceased would have become legally liable to maintain her, had he not died.
33 This 
was substantiated by a  sworn affidavit that demonstrated that the complainant was 
being maintained by the  deceased  and that this was likely  to  turn into a legal 
responsibility  had he not died .   As a result, the Adjudicator  ruled  that the  Board 
correctly relied on  the  complainant's sworn affidavit to confirm her status as a 
dependant.
34  
 
In relation to Ms Hanise,  the Adjudicator observed that Ms Hanise was cohabiting 
with the deceased in a  lifelong relationship at  the time of his death, and that  the 
Board had classified her as a common law spouse of the deceased.
35 Therefore, one 
of the questions that arose for the  Adjudicator was whether there is a distinction in 
law between a cohabitant and a common law spouse that would  affect whether Ms 
Hanise  qualified  as  a  dependant  under  Section  1  of  the  Act.    Regarding  this 
question,  the  Adjudicator  reasoned  that  there  was  no  difference  between  a 
                                                 
30   Hlathi Para 18.  See also Ramanyelo and Malatjie. 
31   Hlathi Para 19. 
32   For an example of other individuals who have qualified under this provision, see Van Zyl v Delta 
Motor Corporation Salaried Provident Fund PFA/EC/698/04/Z/CN, which held that a deceased 
member's fiancée qualified as a future dependant and was consequently awarded death benefits; 
Wellens v Unsgaard Pension Fund 2002 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA), which held that parents of the 
deceased  qualified  as  future  dependants;  Wasserman  v  Central  Retirement  Annuity  2001  6 
BPLR 2160 (PFA). 
33   Hlathi Para 20. 
34   Hlathi Para 20. 
35   Hlathi Para 21. MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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cohabitant  and  a  common  law  spouse  because  these  terms  are  used 
interchangeably  by  legal academics.
36  Therefore, the remaining  relevant  question 
was  whether  Ms  Hanise  qualified  as  a  dependant  pursuant  to  the  Act .    In 
determining this question, the Adjudicator observed that the Act in  Section 1 b(ii) 
recognises  and defines  a  spouse of a  member  as a dependant.
37  The relevant 
sections read as follows: 
 
dependant, in relation to a member,  means – 
(a)  … 
(b)  a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable 
for maintenance, if such person – 
(i)  …; 
(ii)  is the spouse of the member; 
 
spouse means a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil 
union partner of a member in accordance with the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act 
No. 68 of 1961), the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act No. 
68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act, 2006 (Act No. 17 of 2006), or the tenets 
of a religion.
38 
 
In light of this  recognition, the question  to be determined by  the Adjudicator was 
whether Ms Hanise qualified as a spouse .   The Adjudicator initially reasoned that 
since Ms Hanise had a  formal relationship with  the deceased, which lasted for a 
period of seventeen years, of which nine years were spent as a husband and wife, 
she was satisfied that the deceased and  Ms Hanise were permanent life partners, 
and therefore the latter probably qualified as a spouse by virtue of being regarded as 
a spouse in terms of the amended definition of "spouse" in the Act.
39 Nevertheless, 
the Adjudicator argued that Ms Hanise was disqualified as a spouse for two reasons.  
The first was that the new definition of "spouse" in the Act did not have retrospective 
application,  given that  it came into operation on 13  September  2007,  while  the 
deceased had passed away on 27 March 2002.  The Adjudicator also noted that the 
2007 amendments to the Act had expressly indicated the provisions that would apply 
retrospectively, and the definition of a spouse was not one of them.
40 The second 
                                                 
36   Hlathi Para 22. 
37  Hlathi Para 23. 
38   S 1 Pension Funds Act, as amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act. 
39   S 1 Pension Funds Act, as amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act.  See Hlathi para 28. 
40   S 1 Pension Funds Act, as amended by the Pension Funds Amendment Act.  See Cockcroft v 
Mine Employees Pension Fund 2007 3 BPLR 296 (PFA), which held that the provisions in the MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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reason was that Ms Hanise and the deceased had not solemnised their relationship 
in accordance with the Civil Union Act.
41 
 
Since Ms Hanise did not qualify as a legal dependant under Section 1 (b)(ii), the next 
question the  Adjudicator  had to consider was whether she qualified as a factual 
dependant  under  Section  1 (b)(i).
42    The Adjudicator reasoned  that  the evidence 
before  her  was  sufficient  to  bring  Ms  Hanise  within  the  meaning  of  a  factual 
dependant, and concluded that the  Fund  was correct in considering her in the 
distribution of the benefits.  In reaching this conclusion, the Adjudicator rejected a 
previous  ruling  by  the  Adjudicator  in  Van  der  Merwe,  which  held  that  factual 
dependency  requires  a  dominant-servient  relationship,  in  which  one  party  is  the 
substantive  provider.
43  In determining whether Ms Hanise qualified as a factual 
dependant pursuant to Section 1(b)(i), the Adjudicator first observed that under the 
test in Van der Merwe, Ms Hanise would only qualify as a factual dependant were 
she  able  to  establish  that  the  deceased  was  the  substantive  provider  in  their 
relationship.
44 Essentially, the test required the Board, in exercising its powers under 
Section 37C, to regard Ms Hanise as a factual dependant in circumstances in which 
she was able to establish that the deceased  member was the dominant financial 
provider in their relationship.  
 
In determining the validity of the requirement of a dominant-servient relationship in 
the Act and its  applicability to the facts of this case, the  Adjudicator rejected this 
dominant-servient  test,  and  noted  that  Section  1(b)(i)  of  the  Act  does  not 
contemplate  a dominant-servient relationship in which a pension member is  the 
dominant person who maintains the dependant immediately prior to his or her death, 
as  a  basis  for  qualifying  as  a  factual  dependant .  Furthermore,  the  Adjudicator 
reasoned that a purposive and contextual interpretation of  Section 1 (b)(i)  reveals 
that the intention of the legislature was to give effect to  the purpose of Section 37C, 
which is to protect proven  dependency  even for persons  who are involved in a 
relationship  that  the  law  does  not  necessarily  accept  as  constituting  a  legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pension  Funds  Amendment  Act  relating  to  divorce  benefits  were  intended  to  apply 
retrospectively. 
41   17 of 2006. 
42   Hlathi Para 31. 
43   Hlathi Para 33. 
44   Hlathi Para 32. MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
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dependency.
45 According to the  Adjudicator's reasoning, since the legislature does 
not  refer  to  the  terms  "totally"  or  "wholly"  dependent  in  the  provisions  of 
Section 1 (b)(i),  there  is  no  exhaustive  list  of  degree  or  levels  of  dependency.  
Contrary to the suggestion in Van der Merwe, total dependency is consequently not 
the  sole  measure  by  which  to  determine  dependency  for  purposes  of 
Section 1 (b)(i).
46  
 
Accordingly, it  would be contrary to the legislative intent to exclude a party for 
purposes of  Section  1 (b)(i) of  the  Act,  on the basis that  he/she had an inter -
dependent relationship with a deceased member or that  the parties had an equal 
relationship  as  opposed  to  a  dominant -servient  one.    Based  on  the  forgoing 
rationale, the Adjudicator ruled that in cases arising under Section 1 (b)(i) involving a 
surviving cohabitant it was sufficient to prove that the party seeking benefits was in a 
permanent relationship of mutual dependence or interdependence and ran a shared 
and  common household  with the deceased,  and as a consequence of the other 
party's death he/she was financially worse off.
47  
 
In applying the above principle to this matter,  the Adjudicator found that Ms Hanise 
and the deceased contributed equally towards bond payments of both their homes 
and other household expenses.   The Adjudicator also found it significant that the 
parties mutually supported each other in a relationship that lasted for  a period of 
seventeen years, and that Ms Hanise's financial position had dramatically changed 
since the deceased's death.   Based on these findings,  the Adjudicator ruled that 
Ms Hanise fell within the scope of the definition of a factual dependant as set out in 
Section  1 (b)(i) of the Act, and was correctl y  regarded  as a dependant by  the 
Board.
48  
 
The Adjudicator also considered  the second responsibility of  the Board, which, as 
indicated  above, requires  it  to  decide  on an  equitable  distribution of  the  benefits 
amongst  all  identified  dependants.
49  In  determining  whether  the  Board  acted 
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equitably in the distribution of the benefits, the Adjudicator observed that in making 
its  decision,  the  Board  needed  to  consider  all  relevant  information  and  ignore 
irrelevant factors.  Furthermore, the Board should not rigidly adhere to a policy or 
fetter their discretion in any other way.
50 The Adjudicator also noted that  her duty 
was  not  to  decide  what  the   fairest  or  most  generous  distribution  was,  but  to 
determine whether the Board had acted rationally and arrived at a proper and lawful 
decision.
51 Consequently, the Adjudicator could only set  aside the Board's decision 
should it have exercised its discretionary powers unreasonably and improperly. 
 
In the present matter, t he Adjudicator found that  the Board allocated sixty-six per 
cent of the benefits to Ms Hanise because  its investigation revealed that she ran a 
common household  with  the  deceased for  nine  years, and that they were inter -
dependent as confirmed by evidence of shared expenses.  It is important to mention 
that the Adjudicator did not consider the third responsibility, which requires the Board 
to make an appropriate mode of payment, because it was not pertinent to the matter.  
Considerations of the third responsibility typically arise when a minor beneficiary is 
involved.
52  The  Adjudicator  was  satisfied  that  the  Board  acted  reasonably  and 
properly and considered relevant factors in settling upon its decision, and as a result 
there were no legal grounds to alter the Board's decision in the matter. 
 
5  The Implications of Hlathi v University of Fort Hare Retirement Fund 
 
Hlathi is important and should be welcomed by the pension funds industry because it 
clarifies a grey area and brings finality to the law.  Previously and in light of the 
decision  in  Volks,  a  grey  area  emerged  in  pension  law  because  of  the  different 
decisions by the Adjudicator.  According to a decision by Murphy, the Board had the 
discretion to accord to same-sex couples and cohabitants or life partners the same 
rights as are accorded to heterosexual married couples.
53 Murphy's decision was 
motivated by the desire to prevent pension funds from discriminating on the basis of 
marital status, as provided by Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
                                                 
50   Sithole. 
51   See Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund (1) 2001 10 BPLR 2574 (PFA); Ditshabe v 
Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund (2) 2001 10 BPLR 2579 (PFA). 
52   See Mhango and Dyani 2009 PER 144 for recent difficulties arising from the third responsibility of 
the Board under S 37C of the Act. 
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Africa,  1996  (hereafter  Constitution).  More  importantly,  Murphy's  decision  was 
designed to comply with the instruction in Section 39(1) of the Constitution.  This 
section provides that "when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum, 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom".
54 As a result, in Southern Life Association, 
Murphy indirectly applied the Constitution and interpreted the Act as promoting the 
rights  of  pension  fund  members  and  their  beneficiaries  not  to  be  discriminated 
against  on  the  basis  of  marital  status  as  contained  in  Section  9(3)  of  the 
Constitution.
55  
 
However,  Murphy's  decision  differed  from  that  of  the  subsequent  Adjudicator 
Ngalwana, who, following the decision in Volks (which held that it was permissible for 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act to discriminate on the basis of marital 
status in the provision of maintenance benefits by not recognising the plaintiff, who 
could have married the deceased but chose not to, as a spouse), held that a person 
who could have married a deceased pension fund member but chose not to, should 
not be accorded the benefits of a spouse of a deceased member in the Act.  In 
addition, he decided that in order to qualify as a factual dependant, the surviving 
cohabitant had to prove that the deceased was the dominant financial provider in 
their relationship.
56 These conflicting decisions created uncertainty in the law.  The 
ruling in Van der Merwe left pension funds uncertain regarding whether to consider 
surviving  cohabitants  as  factual  dependants.    Many  pension  funds  either  sought 
clarity from the Adjudicator or refused to consider surviving cohabitants as factual 
dependants  on  the  authority  of  Volks  and  Van  der  Merwe.    Others  such  as  the 
Eskom Pension and Provident Fund adopted policies that incorporated and applied 
the  dominant-servient  test  as  a  criterion  for  dealing  with  death  claims  involving 
surviving cohabitants.  For example, following Van der Merwe, the Eskom Pension 
and Provident Fund adopted a policy to help them deal with death claims, which 
provides as follows: 
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If a member dies in service and the Fund receives a claim from a live-in or 
common-law partner, the Fund will apply the dominant/servant relationship 
test where the partner who was a member of the Fund was dominant in the 
relationship,  with  the  surviving  partner  substantially  dependent  on  the 
deceased.  In such an event, the surviving partner may be considered to 
benefit from the lump sum death benefit.
57 
 
Hence, Hlathi should be welcomed because it ensures that the Act is interpreted in a 
manner  that  promotes  the  values  that  underlie  an  open  and  democratic  society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
58  
 
In the aftermath of  Hlathi, there are a number of requirements that pension funds 
have to take into consideration when dealing with such matters in future.  Firstly, the 
requirements  pronounced  in  Hlathi  must  fully  inform  the  rules  or  policies  of  any 
registered  pension  fund  when  dealing  with  death  claims  involving  surviving 
cohabitants.  Pension funds, such as the Eskom Pension and Provident Fund, which 
may have adopted policies or rules in accordance with the dominant-servient test as 
the basis for dealing with claims involving surviving cohabitants, will have to amend 
their rules or policies in this regard, and ensure that this test is no longer employed 
as a basis for qualifying a factual dependant.  Instead, pension fund rules or policies 
should  comply  with  the  decision  in  Hlathi.    In  addition  to  this  requirement,  it  is 
recommended that pension funds request members advise them of the existence of 
a cohabitant or life partner for purposes of record-keeping.  Pension funds could also 
incorporate the requirements in Hlathi into their rules or policies as evidenced by the 
Eskom Pension and Provident Fund policy above, which was adopted in reaction to 
the  determination  in  Van  der  Merwe.    The  above  recommendations  will  allow 
pension funds to keep a record of existing cohabitants or life partners, and assist 
them  to  identify  the  same  and  dispose  of  death  claims  in  a  procedurally  fair, 
economical and expeditious manner.  
 
Another requirement of Hlathi is that cohabitants are now covered under the Act.  
Therefore, pension funds may no longer reject death claims arising from surviving 
cohabitants  unless  the  objective  criteria  set  in  Hlathi  are  not  met.    A  further 
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observation of the requirements in Hlathi is that they could potentially lead to the 
improvement of the lives of many South  Africans, who choose not to marry their 
partners  (or  to  enter  into  a  civil  partnership  under  the  Civil  Union  Act),  but  live 
together permanently and continue to have financial  dependency on their partner 
after  their  partner's  death.    As  the  Adjudicator  correctly  noted  in  Smith  v  Eskom 
Pension and Provident Fund,
59 "when a breakdown of an intimate relationship takes 
place, it would be unjust and perhaps callous to ignore complex issues of financial 
dependency which arise between the parties involved." It is within the context of this 
observation that Hlathi is likely to improve the lives of surviving cohabitants in South 
Africa. 
 
6  Criticism of Hlathi v University of Fort Hare Retirement Fund 
 
While  the  determination  in  Hlathi  should  be  welcomed  for the  reasons  that  have 
been provided above, the determination is weak in some respects and should be 
criticised for failing to adhere to previous determinations comprehensively.  Hlathi 
would have had a much wider impact, had the Adjudicator been consistent in her 
application of the previous determinations in relation to surviving cohabitants.  As 
indicated earlier, prior to 2005, the Adjudicator had formulated a two-pronged factual 
dependency test (cohabitants in particular) and consistently applied the test for a 
period of seven years.
60 The first question under this test is whether the parties (that 
is, the party seeking death benefits and  the deceased pension member) lived in a 
relationship of mutual dependence.  The second question is whether the parties ran 
a shared and common household.  According to the Adjudicator, the first prong of 
the  test  is  qualified  by  the  requirement  that  mutual  dependence  must  involve, 
amongst  other  things,  an  emotional  and  intimate  or  sexu al  bond  between  the 
parties.
61  This test was  overruled  by  Van  der Merwe  in  2005.    Coincidentally,  in 
reversing Van der Merwe, the determination in Hlathi effectively reverted the legal 
position  on  these  matters  back  to  the  pre-Van  der  Merwe  position  that  was 
introduced by Murphy in Southern Life Association.  However, Hlathi ignored the 
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requirement  of  an  emotional  and  intimate  or  sexual  bond  in  the  new  factual 
dependency test.  As a result, this may give rise to a new grey area in the law.  
 
The requirement and application of an emotional and intimate or sexual bond in the 
factual dependency test is significant because it helps pension funds to distinguish 
between  people  who  are  living  together  as  a  husband  and  wife  without  the 
formalities of marriage but with some objective element of permanency, and those 
such  as  flatmates  and  others  who  live  together  as  a  matter  of  convenience  and 
without a clear indication of permanency of their relationship.  South African courts 
have acknowledged that it is a well established practice in South Africa that people 
live together either as a consequence of an intimate or sexual relationship or in some 
instances as a mere matter of convenience, and the question that often confronts 
boards is the manner in which to distinguish the two for purposes of Section 37C 
read together with the definition of "dependant" in the Act.
62 In De Wilzem v South 
African Retirement Annuity Fund,
63 the Adjudicator critically examined the lawfulness 
of considering casual relationships such as flatmates or members of a commune as 
dependants if they were pooling financial resources .  According to the Adjudicator, 
such persons, even if they could show mutual dependence, were not contemplated 
by the legislature.  The problem is that the reason provided by the Adjudicator in De 
Wilzem, which was the application of the dominant-servient theory, was rejected in 
Hlathi.  This requires a different justification for excluding flatmates or members of a 
commune as dependants within the meaning of the Act.  It is suggested that the 
answer  may  be  found  in  the  application  of  the  requirement  of  an  emotional  and 
intimate or sexual bond because it allows a proper distinction to be drawn between 
persons who can be considered dependants and those who cannot.  In other words, 
there is no doubt that a flatmate or a member of a commune cannot be considered a 
dependant under the Act even though they can prove both interdependence under 
the standard in Hlathi, and that they lived in a relationship of mutual dependence and 
ran  a  shared  and  common  household  because  there  will  be  no  element  of 
permanency and, more importantly, no emotional and intimate or sexual bond.  
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This note submits that unlike flatmates or members of a commune, a person should 
qualify as a factual dependant if he/she can establish that they lived in a relationship 
of mutual dependence or interdependence, involving an emotional and intimate or 
sexual bond, and ran a shared and common household.  The latter proposition is 
supported by the Adjudicator's determination in Fourie. In this case, the Adjudicator 
upheld  the  Board's  decision,  in  particular  on  the  basis  that  a  person  who  had 
previously for a period of nine years lived with a deceased member in a relationship 
of mutual dependence involving an intimate and emotional or sexual bond and a 
shared common household, but who had then amicably severed this relationship to 
merely maintain a platonic relationship, does not qualify as a factual dependant.
64 In 
other cases,  the Adjudicator has emphasised the need for the  requirement of an 
emotional and intimate or sexual bond, and appears to have required evidence of an 
intimate or emotional bond or at least evidence from which a reasonable inference of 
such a bond can be made.
65 
 
Given the above observations, this note submits that the failure by the Adjudicator to 
expressly endorse the emotional and intimate or sexual bond requirement  creates a 
potential and unnecessary  ambiguity in the law  that needs to be  clarified.   While 
some  commentators have  criticised  the  emotional  and  intimate  or  sexual  bond 
requirement  as  having  no  s ignificance  in  the  application  of  Section  37C,  it  is 
submitted that this remains relevant in the application of Section 37C given previous 
cases and  the changing societal views on relationships.
66  For example, this note 
submits that it is not persuasive to maintain that Section 37C was intended to cover 
a couple who dated and cohabited for a period of twelve months, but continue to live 
together  (as flatmates)  because of financial  convenience and  uncerta inty  as  to 
whether they remain permanently committed to each other.  In other words, this note 
concurs with the Adjudicator in  De Wilzem that Section 37C was not intended to 
apply  to  flatmates  or  members  of  a  commune.    In  these  circumstances,  the 
requirement  of  an  emotional  and  intimate  or  sexual  bond  becomes  relevant  to 
determining whether the surviving cohabitant qualifies as a factual dependant within 
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the scope of Hlathi.  Therefore, while Hlathi should be welcomed for the reasons 
indicated above, as it has been by the pension funds industry and academics,
67 it 
should be criticised for its failure to re-establish fully the factual dependency test that 
prevailed prior to  Van der Merwe.  It is important to note that despite the above 
criticism, the emotional and intimate or sexual bond requirement may still form part 
of  the  new  test  because  it  may  not  have  been  necessary  or  relevant  for  the 
Adjudicator to mention it in the context of the facts in Hlathi, hence its omission.  In 
other  words,  it  is  possible  that  the  requirement  of  an  emotional  and  intimate  or 
sexual bond was not expressly addressed by the Adjudicator because the facts of 
the  case  did  not  permit  this,  and  that  in  all  appropriate  circumstances  the 
requirement  remains  relevant  and  applicable.    Nevertheless,  since  it  is  not  clear 
whether the omission of the emotional and intimate or sexual bond requirement was 
a considered decision by the Adjudicator or a mere oversight, this note recommends 
that the future Adjudicator clarify this point of law. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
This note has critically discussed Hlathi, which dealt with the question of whether a 
surviving cohabitant who was in an inter-dependent relationship with the deceased 
may qualify as a factual dependant under the Act.  It was decided in Hlathi that a 
cohabitant qualifies as a factual dependant if he/she can establish the existence of a 
permanent relationship of mutual dependency or inter-dependency, and that he/she 
shared a common household with the deceased pension fund member. 
 
In this note, it has been argued that the determination in Hlathi should be welcomed 
because it clarifies the law and uncertainties that emerged following  the ruling in 
Volks.   This  note has  demonstrated  that  the  legal position on these matters has 
reverted to the position that prevailed between 1998 and 2005, and has criticised 
what appears to be an omission of an important element of the factual dependency 
test, which is that a relationship of mutual dependency must involve an emotional 
and intimate or sexual bond.  This note has suggested that the Adjudicator should 
continue  to  apply  this  element  because  it  remains  relevant  within  the  context  of 
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Section 37C, that the omission of this element may have been an oversight, and that 
this element remains part of the factual dependency test to be applied by boards of 
pension funds in relevant cases.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Dyani Speculum Juris 
Dyani N "Distribution of death benefits in terms of Section 37C of the Pension 
Funds Act:  Rejecting the dominant-servient test in cases of cohabitation" 
Speculum Juris (forthcoming) 
 
Goldblatt SALJ 
Goldblatt B "Regulating domestic partnerships: A necessary step in the 
development of South African family law" 2003 SALJ 120 610–629 
 
Khumalo "Death Benefits Under Section 37C of the Act" 
Khumalo S "Death Benefits Under Section 37C of the Act" (Unpublished paper 
delivered at the Pension Lawyers Association of South Africa Conference 7 May 
2008 Sandton) 
 
Manamela SA Merc LJ 
Manamela T "Chasing Away the Ghost in Death Benefits:  A Closer Look at 
Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956" 2005 SA Merc LJ 278–279 
 
Marx and Hanekom Manual 
Marx GL and Hanekom K (eds) The Manual on South African Retirement Funds 
and other Employee Benefits Volume 1 (LexisNexis Durban 2007) 
 
Mhango SA Merc LJ 
Mhango MO "An Examination of the Accurate Application of the Dependency 
Test under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956:  Case Comments" 2008 SA Merc 
LJ 126–135 
 MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 
202/204 
 
Mhango and Dyani PER 
Mhango MO and Dyani N "The Duty to Effect an Appropriate Mode of Payment 
to Minor Pension Beneficiaries under Scrutiny in Death Claims" 2009 12(2) PER 
144–168 
 
Nevondwe Insurance and Tax Journal 
Nevondwe L "Cohabitation versus Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 
1956" 2009 Insurance and Tax Journal June 8–13 
 
Wood-Bodley SALJ 
Wood-Bodley MC "Freedom of Testation and the Bill of Rights:  Minister of 
Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd" 2007 SALJ 687–702 
 
Register of legislation 
 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
Pension Funds Amendment Act 11 of 2007 
 
Register of court cases 
 
Chittenden v Estcourt Butchery (Pty) Ltd Provident Fund and Another 2001 5 BPLR 
2001 (PFA) 
Cockcroft v Mine Employees Pension Fund 2007 3 BPLR 296 (PFA) 
De Wilzem and Another v South African Retirement Annuity Fund 2005 2 BPLR 180 
(PFA) 
Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund (1) 2001 10 BPLR 2574 (PFA) 
Ditshabe v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund (2) 2001 10 BPLR 2579 (PFA) 
Dobie NO v National Technikon Retirement Pension Fund 1999 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) 
Fourie v Central Retirement Annuity Fund 2001 2 BPLR 1580 (PFA) 
Hlathi v University of Fort Hare Retirement Fund and Others 2009 1 BPLR 37 (PFA) MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 
203/204 
 
Jacobs NO v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another 2001 1 BPLR 1488 
(PFA) 
Kaplan and Another NNO v Professional and Executive Retirement Fund and Others 
2001 10 BPLR 2541 (W) 
Malatjie v Idwala Provident Fund 2005 1 BPLR 45 (PFA) 
Maritz v Absa Groep Pensioenfonds PFA/GA/1387/00/KM (unreported) 
Martin v Beka Provident Fund 2000 2 BPLR 196 (PFA) 
Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund 2002 8 BPLR 3703 
(W) 
Matene v Noordberg Group Life-Assurance Scheme 2001 2 BPLR 1604 (PFA) 
Mthiyane v Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others 2001 7 BPLR 2230 (PFA) 
Musgrave v Unisa Retirement Fund 2000 4 BPLR 415 (PFA) 
Ramanyelo v Mine Workers Provident Fund 2005 1 BPLR 67 (PFA) 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2004 1 BPLR 
5333 (CC) 
Sithole v ICS Provident Fund and Another 2000 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) 
Smith v Eskom Pension and Provident Fund 2009 3 BPLR 343 (PFA) 
TWC and Others v Rentokil Pension Fund and Another 2000 2 BPLR 216 (PFA) 
Van de Berg v Durban Pension Fund 2003 3 BPLR 4518 (PFA) 
Van der Merwe and Another v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another 2005 5 
BPLR 463 (PFA) 
Van der Merwe and Others v The Southern Life Association Ltd and Another 2000 3 
BPLR 321 (PFA) 
Van Zyl v Delta Motor Corporation Salaried Provident Fund and Another 
PFA/EC/698/04/Z/CN (unreported) 
Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
Wasserman v Central Retirement Annuity 2001 6 BPLR 2160 (PFA) 
Wellens v Unsgaard Pension Fund 2002 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA) 
 MO MHANGO                       PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 
204/204 
 
Register of internet sources 
 
Eskom Pension and Provident Fund www.eppf.co.za 
Eskom Pension and Provident Fund 2009 Member's guide to benefits 
http://www.eppf.co.za/members/Members%20Guide.pdf [date of use 6 Nov 
2009] 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
PER  Potchefstroomse  Elektroniese  Regsblad  (Potchefstroom 
  Electronic Law Journal) 
SALJ  South African Law Journal 
SA Merc LJ  South African Mercantile Law Journal 